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The DQLPDOORYHUV¶SDUDGR["2QWKHHWKLFVRIµSHWIRRG¶ 
 
Josh Milburn 
Queen¶s University Belfast 
 
7KHDQLPDOORYHUV¶SDUDGR[LVWKHIDFW that animal lovers ± people who share their lives 
with nonhuman companions for whom they feel deep love and affection ± typically contribute to 
more nonhuman animal (NHA) death and suffering than they would if they did not keep 
companions. This is because dogs and cats (upon whom this chapter will focus) will typically be 
fed large amounts of NHA flesh, and this flesh is the product of practices that inflict death and 
suffering as a matter of course. Paradoxically, it could be that the best thing that some people 
could do to reduce NHA death and suffering is to stop being animal lovers. This sounds deeply 
odd, and rightly so. This is not to say that individual animal lovers will recognize the oddness of 
their situation; it is possible that they feel love towards only certain NHAs. When the individual 
animal lover feels the conflict, they likely face the YHJHWDULDQ¶V GLOHPPD: the problem of 
UHFRQFLOLQJ ³IHHGLQJ RQH¶V [companion] an animal-based diet that may be perceived as best 
promoting their well-being with concerns over animal welfare [and animal rights] and 
environmental degradation threatened by such diets´(Rothgerber 2013, 77). 
There has been some discussion of this issue both inside and outside academia. Despite 
this, academic animal ethics as a whole KDVEHHQVXUSULVLQJO\TXLHWRQWKHDQLPDOORYHUV¶SDUDGR[
DQG WKH YHJHWDULDQ¶V GLOHPPD. On the one hand, this is surprising, given that it is at the 
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intersection of two key issues in animal ethics: the ethics of NHA-derived foods and the ethics of 
companionship. On the other, it is unsurprising, as it seems to throw up serious conflicts between 
our obligations to our companions and towards those NHAs killed for food. 
Recent prominent works on animal ethics from a variety of directions have not addressed 
the issue. For example, Clare Palmer (2010) advocates a contextual animal ethics, in which we 
have different kinds of obligations to companions than to ³ZLOG´ 1+$V EXW GRHV QRW GLVFXVV
companion diets, despite considering FRPSDQLRQV¶ YLROHQFH DJDLQVW ³ZLOG´ DQLPDOV. Palmer 
coauthored the recent Companion Animal Ethics (Sandøe, Corr and Palmer 2016) in which 
companion diet is addressed, but discussions focus upon health, resource use and environmental 
impact, rather than the problems with NHA-derived foodstuffs. Alasdair Cochrane (2012) 
defends an account of justice centered on the interest rights of sentient animals. Though he offers 
extensive discussions of the injustice of current food practices (2012, ch. 4) and of our 
obligations towards companions (2012, 129-37; cf. Cochrane 2014), he does not address the 
conflict between them that arises when we feed companions the flesh of other NHAs.1 Gary 
Francione (2007; 2008), who supports the abolition of all use of NHAs, stresses the importance 
of veganism and, though claiming that we should stop producing more, argues we must care for 
existing companions. Despite this, and though he keeps vegan dogs (Francione 2007, vi), the 
issue is not addressed in his major works. 
There is, then, a surprising lack of consideration in the animal ethics literature of the 
ethics of companion diets. One exception to this general trend is the work of Sue Donaldson and 
Will Kymlicka (2013), who draw a picture of a zoopolis, a mixed human/NHA state. On their 
picture, different NHAs are awarded different political rights based on their relationship with this 
state, though all sentient NHAs possess certain fundamental rights, such as the right not to be 
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killed by humans. NHAs who are part of the mixed community, such as companions, are 
citizens, while those who live among but apart from society, such as garden birds, are denizens. 
³:LOG´ NHAs are sovereign over their own communities. Donaldson and Kymlicka are acutely 
aware of the problem sketched above: 
 
Amongst our many duties to domesticated animals, we are responsible for ensuring that 
they have adequate nutrition. And here we encounter another dilemma: do we have an 
obligation to feed meat to our domesticated animals, particularly if this is part of their 
(so-called) natural diet? Must we turn some animals into meat in order to fulfil our duties 
to our domesticated animal co-citizens? (2013, 149) 
 
Ultimately, ³GRJDQGFDWPHPEHUVRIPL[HGKXPDQ-animal society do not have a right to food 
WKDW LQYROYHV WKH NLOOLQJ RI RWKHU DQLPDOV´   Readers may be surprised at the 
suggestion that companions not be fed flesh, and that they instead be fed a vegan diet, but more 
and more people are now exploring this option. In 2010, research on the ethical credentials of 
GLIIHUHQW ³SHW IRRG´ EUDQGV ZDV SXEOLVKHG LQ Ethical Consumer (Brown 2010). Among other 
things, the report looked at which products contained NHA-derived ingredients and which were 
the product of animal testing ± the latter being a dimension of the paradox I cannot explore here. 
The report recommended several vegan-friendly brands, including Ami and Benevo ± companies 
that produce vegan foods for both dogs and cats (Brown 2010, 12). 
One may think, given their talk RI³FR-FLWL]HQV´DQG³PL[HG«VRFLHW\´ that Donaldson 
DQG .\POLFND¶V conclusion is a quirk of their framework, and that, if we do not accept their 
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system, we need not accept their conclusion. Here, I could argue that we should accept 
'RQDOGVRQ DQG .\POLFND¶V IUDPHZRUN Lndeed, it is a very good one. However, it is perhaps 
more interesting to note that we can construct a very strong argument for vegan companions 
using premises that, within animal ethics, are not at all controversial. I will now set out this 
argument, before offering an explanation of the various premises and steps. I will then spend the 
remainder of the chapter exploring possible objections to this argument and offering some 
practical suggestions. 
 
Premise 1: It is wrong for us to kill or inflict suffering upon sensitive nonhuman animals 
unless there is some reason of overriding importance. 
Premise 2: The production of nonhuman animal-derived foodstuffs almost always 
involves inflicting death and suffering upon sensitive nonhuman animals. 
Premise 3: Without the consumption of nonhuman animal-derived foodstuffs, there 
would be no production of nonhuman animal-derived foodstuffs. 
Interim conclusion: Given Premises 1-3, the consumption of nonhuman animal-
derived foodstuffs is generally wrong, unless there is some reason of overriding 
importance. 
Premise 4: There is generally no reason of overriding importance justifying the 
consumption of nonhuman animal-derived foodstuffs by our companions. 
Conclusion: Given the interim conclusion and Premise 4, feeding nonhuman 
animal companions nonhuman animal-derived foodstuffs is generally wrong. 
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Premise 1 is a normative claim uncontroversial within animal ethics. Some profess to hold the 
view that the death and suffering of NHAs is of no moral significance. Such people will not 
accept this argument. Importantly, though, it is highly unlikely that an animal lover would hold 
this view. What, precisely, counts as a reason ³RIRYHUULGLQJ LPSRUWDQFH´ is what I will spend 
much of the remainder of this chapter examining. Our answers will differ depending upon the 
ethical framework we adopt. While utilitarians, like Peter Singer (1995), would allow that the 
prevention of greater suffering is a reason of sufficient magnitude to override a general 
prescription against inflicting suffering, a more deontological thinker, like Tom Regan (1984), 
would not allow this. By contrast, in certain cases of self-defense, Regan might allow the 
infliction of death and suffering, while Singer might not. It is clear that neither greater suffering 
nor self-defense are in the offing in the current case, but other things might be. 
Premise 2 is an empirical claim that would not be denied by anyone familiar with, first, 
modern farming methods, and, second, animal welfare science. There are enough honest 
descriptions and images of the kinds of suffering inherent in food production available in various 
media for me to spare readers the details, beyond noting that suffering and death are as much a 
part of egg and milk production as they are of flesh production. And, while philosophers and 
scientists have previously voraciously denied that NHAs experience pain, it is thankfully rare to 
encounter someone claiming this today. Premise 3, too, is an empirical claim that relies on the 
realities of the market. If, from tomorrow, there was no demand for NHA-derived foodstuffs, it 
would not be long before their production ceased. The interim conclusion does not 
unproblematically follow from premises 1-3. Questions abound about the effects of the behavior 
of a single individual on the market and the obligation to behave morally when those around us 
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do not. However, let us assume that these can be overcome.2 Given all of the above, our 
continued consumption of NHA-derived products is generally wrong. We should note that there 
UHDOO\DUHQR³RYHUULGLQJ´FLUFXPVWDQFHVLQPRVWFDVHVAccording to both the American Dietetic 
Association and Dieticians of Canada (Craig and Mangels 2009; Mangels, Messina and Vesanto 
2003), appropriately planned vegan diets are perfectly healthy for people at any stage of their 
life. Additionally, such diets are easily accessible to almost anyone in the industrialized west. It 
does not instantly follow that companions must be fed vegan diets, which is why an additional 
premise is necessary; however, if Premise 4 is correct, then the conclusion naturally follows: 
feeding companions NHA-derived foodstuffs is generally wrong. 
For the remainder of this chapter, I will explore whether there is generally a reason of 
overriding significance that permits the feeding of NHA-derived foodstuffs to our companions. 
We could certainly construct contrived scenarios where there are reasons of overriding 
importance: For example, if you and your dog are trapped on an island with edible NHAs but no 
edible plants, you can surely kill the animals to feed yourself and your dog. However, extreme 
scenarios do not help us. Instead, I am going to explore four reasons we may think we generally 
have an overriding ethical reason to feed NHA-derived products to our companions. First, I will 
explore whether making our companions vegan is to force them to live an undignified life. 
Second, I will explore the idea that companion veganism is problematically unnatural. Third, I 
will explore the idea that it is unjustly freedom-restricting. Finally, I will consider the most 
important challenge: whether it is unhealthy for the companions to be fed a vegan diet, and what 
this might mean. 
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Dignity 
Conceptions of NHA dignity may be appealing due to the thought that it is wrong, for 
instance, to dress a bear in a tutu and have her ride a unicycle beyond the fact that it is unpleasant 
for the bear. Indeed, we may feel that there is something wrong even if the bear does not mind 
and lives a fulfilled, happy life. A dignity-based argument against companion veganism would 
claim that companions are treated in an undignified way if fed vegan diets. Precisely why 
depends on the particular conception of NHA dignity, of which there are numerous conflicting 
accounts. For example, Elizabeth Anderson claims that ³>W@KH GLJQLW\ RI DQ DQLPDO ZKHWKHU
human or nonhuman, is what is required to make it [sic] decent for human society, for the 
particular, species-VSHFLILF ZD\V LQ ZKLFK KXPDQV UHODWH WR WKHP´  . Lori Gruen¶V
account, on the other hand, is almost the polar opposite6KHVD\VWKDW³>P@DNLQJRWKHUDQLPDOV
µGHFHQWIRUKXPDQVRFLHW\¶LVSUHFLVHO\ZKDWLWPHDQVWRGHQ\WKHPWKHLUGLJQLW\;´LQVWHDG ³we 
dignify the wildness [of NHAs] when we respect their behaviors as meaningful to them and 
recognize that their lives are WKHLUVWROLYH´-5). 
It is not clear how either of these accounts could oppose veganism for companions; in 
making companions vegan, we precisely make them ³decent´ for NHA-respecting society, while, 
DV WKH\ DUH QRW ³ZLOG´ the extent to which companions could have ³ZLOG GLJQLW\´ LV XQFOHDU 
Tying carnivorous diets to dignity is thus a problem with these ³UHODWLRQDO´DSSURDFKHV to NHA 
dignity, but it is even more so with ³LQGLYLGXDOLVW´ accounts of NHA dignity, which tie dignity to 
some kind of trans-specific capacity.3 Take Michael Meyer¶V account (2001), according to which 
all sentient beings possess ³simple dignity.´ Simple dignity, though, is more about moral 
standing than about particular kinds of treatment, so it seems that simple dignity and vegan diets 
have no clear relationship, diminishing its usefulness to the opponent of companion veganism. 
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Martha Nussbaum¶V (2006) account is a paradigm example of the ³VSHFLHV-EDVHG´ 
approach to dignity. She says that D1+$¶Vdignified existence 
 
would seem at least to include the following: adequate opportunities for nutrition and 
physical activity; freedom from pain, squalor and cruelty; freedom to act in ways that are 
FKDUDFWHULVWLF RI WKH VSHFLHV >«@; freedom from fear and opportunities for rewarding 
interactions with other creatures of the same species, and of different species; a chance to 
enjoy the light and air in tranquility. (2006, 326) 
 
This is placed within NussbaXP¶V FDSDELOLWLHV DSSURDFK according to which justice is about 
endorsing various key capabilities. Capabilities are inherently species-dependent (resting upon a 
FRQWURYHUVLDO $ULVWRWHOLDQ QRWLRQ RI ³VSHFLHV´ DQG VR ZKHWKHU a companion has an important 
capability tied to flesh-eating, meaning it would be disrespectful to endorse veganism for that 
FRPSDQLRQGHSHQGVRQKRZZHXQGHUVWDQGWKDWFRPSDQLRQ¶VVSHFLHV,IDGRJLVunderstood as a 
member of the species Canis lupus, along with wolves, then perhaps she has an important flesh-
eating capability. If dogs are members of the species C. familiaris, then this possibility is less 
plausible: the species has arisen in tandem with humans, and so human norms would define that 
spHFLHV¶V norms. The same is true of cats, whom we may understand as members of Felis 
silvestris, along with wildcats, or as members of F. catus. However, even if we consider dogs and 
cats to be members of Canis lupus and Felis silvestris respectively, veganism need not be 
undignified. Nussbaum argues that 
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Some capabilities are actually bad, and should be inhibited by law >«@No constitution 
protects capabilities qua capabilities. There must be prior evaluation, deciding which are 
good, and, among the good, which are most central, most clearly involved defining the 
minimum FRQGLWLRQVIRUDOLIHZLWK>«@ dignity. (2006, 166)4 
 
The mere fact some NHA has the capacity to x does not mean that she could not have a dignified 
life without x. As I have argued, we do have good reason to believe that companions eating flesh 
LV³DFWXDOO\EDG´ and so it is not the kind of capability we should promote. Nussbaum openly 
endorses this kind of picture; she argues that the natural is not always good (2006, 400), and 
indicates that NHAs¶ ³KDUP-FDXVLQJFDSDELOLWLHV´DUH probably ³QRWDPRQJWKRVHWKDWVKRXOGEH
SURWHFWHGE\SROLWLFDODQGVRFLDOSULQFLSOHV´%\ZD\RIH[DPSOHVKHSRLQWVWRD]RR 
that, rather than providing her/him with prey, provides a tiger with a ball on a rope (2006, 370-
 ³:KHUHYHU SUHGDWRU\ DQLPals are living under diUHFW KXPDQ VXSSRUW DQG FRQWURO´ she 
suggests ³WKHVH VROXWLRQV VHHP WR EH WKH PRVW HWKLFDOO\ VRXQG´   7KRXJK vegan 
companions are not mentioned, it seems to be the same kind of problem, and so warrants the 
same kind of solution. Ultimately, 1XVVEDXP¶VDFFRXQWRIIHUVno support for the suggestion that 
we feed flesh to our companions, while her own words seemingly oppose the practice. 
I have suggested that key accounts of NHA dignity do not support the claim that we 
should feed companions flesh, but, in so doing, have taken for granted that accounts of NHA 
dignity can be useful at all. This idea is controversial (Cochrane 2010; Zuolo 2015). It is 
possible, first, that dignity does not add anything to existing discussions (Macklin 2003), and 
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that accounts of dignity are reducible to other concepts. If so, accounts of NHA dignity fail the 
requirement that they are non-redundant (Zuolo 2015, 3). )XUWKHUPRUHDFFRXQWV OLNH0H\HU¶V, 
although serving to confer moral worth or standing on individual NHAs, do not offer guidance 
for action (Zulolo 2015, 3), and so offer little to the present question. Issues of space mean that 
exploration of problems with dignity is impossible, but it is worth noting a final worry often 
raised: namely, that appeals to ³dignity´ are pure rhetoric, and that the term is used merely to 
justify whatever it is that is being defended. This idea is put eloquently by Singer, who writes 
that ³>S@hilosophers frequently introduce ideas of dignity « at the point at which other reasons 
appear to be lacking, but this is hardly good enough. Fine phrases are the last resource of those 
ZKRKDYHUXQRXWRIDUJXPHQWV´; cf. Macklin 2003). So, not only is it unclear how a 
dignity argument could ground opposition to vegan diets for companions, but there is an open 
question about the value of dignity arguments (especially in animal ethics) in the first place. 
 
Naturalness 
7KHLGHDWKDWVRPHWKLQJLV³QDWXUDO´LV found in some accounts of dignity, but it can be 
separated from them. A naturalness argument against feeding vegan diets to companions would 
look something like this: 
 
Premise 1: Companions are naturally flesh eaters. 
Interim conclusion: To allow them to be flesh eaters would promote the natural. 
Premise 2: Promoting the natural is (prima facie) good. 
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Conclusion: Allowing companions to be flesh eaters is (prima facie) good. 
 
There are at least two contentious elements here; the first is the identification of the ³QDWXUDO´
and the second is the claim that the ³QDWXUDO´LVJRRG 
The good of naturalness is sometimes articulated in environmental ethics, but it is 
controversial. There are many ³QDWXUDO´ WKLQJV WKDW ZH FRQVLGHU WR EH YHU\ EDG LQFOXGLQJ
suffering, starvation and disease. Further WKH FODLP WKDW VRPHWKLQJ LV ³QDWXUDO´ is often a 
smokescreen for oppression. Examples abound: racism and sexual abuse are called ³QDWXUDO;´ 
homosexuality and gender equality are declared ³XQQDWXUDO´ However, even if these problems 
can be overcome, it is difficult to see how the defender of flesh foods for companions can invoke 
naturalness without throwing the baby out with the bathwater, as it is hard to frame an account of 
³naturalness´ in which companions themselves are not unnatural. On the view of the 
environmental ethicists John Rodman, Holmes Rolston III and (previously) J. Baird Callicott, for 
example, companions are problematic precisely because they are unnatural, or have been 
denaturalizedDQGVRKDYHEHFRPH³OLYLQJartifacts´(cited in Cochrane 2014, 158). Even if we 
have doubts about the claims of these thinkers, it would be oddly selective to defend companion 
flesh-eating on the grounds of naturalness without also criticizing practically every element of 
the institution of companionship. Consequently, even if we are to promote naturalness, there is 
no easy way to use this to oppose companion veganism: if arguments about naturalness apply, 
they likely apply in ways bad for companionship. 
Even if we can overcome these problems, the argument is incomplete. The ³goodness´ of 
the ³natural´ diet would have to be compared with the badness of its consequences. Even if some 
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(bizarre) person believed naturalness the only good, it remains unclear that they should oppose 
vegan companions; depending on their account of naturalness, it could be that a vegan dog is 
³OHVVXQQDWXUDO´WKDQanimal agriculture, and, given that animal agriculture results in catastrophic 
levels of land use, harmful emissions and chemical pollution, the institution is contributing on an 
enormous scale to the destruction of nature. IW LV SUREDEOH WKDW PRUH ³QDWXUDOQHVV´ ZLOO EH
promoted if the world were to convert to vegan diets for companions. 
Perhaps a more reasonable challenge grounded in naturalness would take the following 
form:5 Companions have natural inclinations towards flesh (or, would naturally seek out flesh), 
and we have an obligation not to interfere with (or, more strongly, to promote) their natural 
inclinations/actions. I do think this argument is more compelling than the previous, but that is 
because it is essentially a freedom-based argument with added naturalness considerations; while 
³naturalness´ does not add much to the argument, it does detract from it, insofar as it raises 
problems. Specifically, the proponent of this argument has the difficult tasks of identifying the 
³QDWXUDO´ FRPSRXQGHG E\ WKH DERYH FRQVLGHUDWLRQV DERXW WKe unnaturalness of companions), 
defending the value of the natural, and finally weighing this value with the problems (including 
problems of unnaturalness and destruction of the natural) associated with feeding companions 
flesh. In all, I suggest that the proponent of this argument would do better to drop the 
³QDWXUDOQHVV´FODLPDQGIRFXVRQIUHHGRPTherefore, it is to that argument that I now turn. 
 
Freedom 
An argument often heard in defense of human consumption of flesh is that people should 
be free to choose what they consume. We recognize this argument for what it is in some 
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contexts; we do not think that people should be free to choose to consume human flesh, for 
instance. Many animal lovers also oppose the freedom to eat dogs and cats; the outrage at the 
annual Yulin Dog Meat Festival in China is illustrative. (The irony that many of the most vocal 
opponents of the festival are non-vegans has not been lost on some commentators.) It cannot be 
the case, then, that the promotion of companion freedom or autonomy necessitates that the 
companions be permitted to eat whatever they like. Nonetheless, a freedom-based argument 
could be made to support flesh-based diets for companions. One could appeal either to the 
freedom of the companions to eat what they would prefer, or perhaps to the freedom of the 
guardians to feed to their companions what is convenient. Donaldson and Kymlicka consider but 
dismiss WKHIRUPHU³:HKDYHPDGHDSRLQWRIHQDEOLQJDQLPDODJHQF\´ they write³«>V@RZK\
in the case of diet, are we advocating that meat should not be among the choices offered to them? 
%HFDXVHWKHOLEHUW\RIFLWL]HQVLVDOZD\VFRQVWUDLQHGE\UHVSHFWIRUWKHOLEHUWLHVRIRWKHUV´
150). They are surely right, and the point stands whether or not we share the authors¶ conception 
of citizenship. It is perverse to suggest that FRPSDQLRQV¶LQWHUHVWLQKaving food that they prefer 
(if they do prefer NHA-derived foods), or guardians¶ interest in feeding easily accessible food to 
their companions, should outweigh the interest that sensitive NHAs have in not having suffering 
inflicted upon them and not being killed. These are some of the most central interests a being can 
possess. 
It is worth remembering that the majority of companions in the west are not given much 
freedom concerning their choice of diet, and are simply fed the canned food that their guardians 
have chosen. However, it is perfectly consistent to imagine a companion having considerable 
choice while remaining vegan. There are multiplHYHJDQ³SHWIRRG´EUDQGVDYDLODEOHDVZHOODV
plenty of tried-and-tested recipes posted online. And there is no reason to rely wholly on 
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processed or cooked foodstuffs. Donaldson and Kymlicka illustrate the way that companion 
choice can be promoted while still working within the confines of veganism: 
 
,W¶VWUXHWKDWKXPDQVQHHGWRHQVXUHWKDWGRJVPHHWWKHLUQXWULWLRQDOQHHGVDQGWKDWWKH\
GRQ¶WRYHUHDWRUHDWIRRGVWKDWZLOOSRLVRQWKHP%XWWKLVVWLOOOHDYHVDODUJHDUHDLQZKLFK
dogs can express their food preferences and make their own choices. Through trial and 
error (and choice amongst optionsLWEHFDPHSHUIHFWO\FOHDUWRXVWKDWRXUGRJ&RGLH¶V
favourite foods included fennel, kale stems, and carrots. And peas were so prized he 
simply helped himVHOI IURP WKH YHJJLH JDUGHQ )UXLW UHDOO\ ZDVQ¶W RI LQWHUHVW 2Q WKH
other hand, his buddy Rolly was mad for bananas. Dogs have individual preferences, and 
(to varying degrees) the competence to make choices based on their preferences. (2013, 
109) 
 
Codie, clearly, is given far greater choice when it comes to food than the vast majority of 
companions. The promotion of companion autonomy should not be understood as in conflict 
with the demand that companions be fed a vegan diet. 
 
Health 
I now move on to the most pressing challenge companion veganism. It might be said that 
while we do have an obligation to abstain from inflicting suffering upon and killing sensitive 
NHAs, this obligation is overridden by the fact that our companions require the flesh of NHAs to 
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be healthy. There is received wisdom in the area (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2013, 143; 
Rothgerber 2014) that while dogs can thrive on vegan diets, cats may not be able to. Indeed, it is 
not hard to find authoritative-sounding statements endorsing this claim. For example, on the 
popular website WebMD, Roxanne Hawn quotes Cailin Heinze (a veterinary nutritionist) as 
VD\LQJWKDW³>I@or cats, [a vegan diet is] really inappropriate. It goes against their physiology and 
LVQ¶WVRPHWKLQJ,Zould recommend at all. For dogs « vegan diets can be done, but they need to 
EHGRQHYHU\YHU\FDUHIXOO\´ (Hawn 2011). Hawn also quotes the guardian of cats fed a vegan 
diet, who explains that her cats are happy and healthy (2011). It is not hard to find anecdotal 
evidence of vegan cats thriving on the one hand and angry condemnation of guardians of vegan 
cats on the other. Here is not the place to solve this particular dispute, especially as the scientific 
literature seems equivocal. In a review of the evidence, Katheryn Michel concluded that the 
nutritional adequacy of some commercially available vegan cat foods has been ³FDOOHG LQWR
question,´ but did not claim that vegan diets are necessarily unsuitable (2006, 1275-7). By 
contrast, a study (Wakefield, Shofer and Michel 2006) examining individual cats found that 
vegetarian diets (including vegan diets) did not have the adverse health effects expected. Lorelei 
Wakefield, the veterinarian who was the lead author of the latter study, runs 
VegetarianCats.com, a website with information about vegetarian and vegan diets for 
companions. She is of the view that a plant-based diet for cats is possible, having raised vegan 
cats, but can be difficult, especially if the cats have pre-existing health problems. 
Given the conflicting comments from experts, this fourth challenge seems a serious one 
for my argument. Were cats unable to survive on a vegan diet, and assuming that they could not 
be provided flesh in a respectful way, it could be that we would have to explore whether there 
was some way we could balance our positive duties towards cats with our negative duties 
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towards other NHAs. One solution, unthinkable to some, would be FRPSDQLRQFDWV¶H[WLQFWLRQ. 
Though we may have gRRGUHDVRQVWRWKLQNFDWV¶H[WLQFWLon would be a bad thing, we also have 
very good reasons to be opposed to continuing to feed flesh to cats. Another possible solution, 
though one perhaps equally problematic, is genetically modifying cats away from carnivory. The 
way forward seems unclear. 
But let us take a step back. The issue of companion diet is more complicated than I have 
previously allowed. First, our obligations concerning dogs and cats may be different, given their 
different physiologies.6 Second, our obligations concerning companion diet have both moral and 
political dimensions. The moral dimension focuses on the actions of guardians, while the 
political dimension focuses on the actions of the state and society ± for example, decisions about 
research funding. In the case of dogs, the moral and the political dimensions are close: we should 
want to see dogs converted to veganism. For individual animal lovers, this means careful 
research and a change in companion diet. For states, the obligation will, in the medium-term, 
mean the banning of flesh-EDVHG ³SHW IRRG´ More immediately, it might mean information 
campaigns and subsidies on vegan dog foods, both of which could be funded by a tax on flesh-
based dog foods. 
With cats, individuals and states appear to have somewhat different obligations. 
Individual animal lovers should not want to risk their companionV¶ health. For guardians who are 
confident that they can provide a suitable vegan diet for their cats, this is the right choice, but 
such individuals may be in a minority. The solution for others is minimizing the amount of 
animal protein fed to companions. Preferable to a wholly flesh-based diet would be feeding cats 
³KDOIYHJHWDULDQELVFXLWVDQGKDOIRUJDQLFZHWPHDW\IRRG´ (Brown and Welch 2010). A mixed 
diet could be combined with the seeking out of the most ethically viable NHA-derived products 
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for companions: organic, free-UDQJH ³KDSS\´ PHDW VWLOO LQYROYHV WKH LQIOLFWLRQ RI DQ HDUO\
gruesome death, but at least there is typically less suffering. Perhaps there are better possibilities: 
the eggs of rescued chickens might be viable, but such chickens would not exist in a world in 
which chickens were not kept for their eggs. Though perhaps unpleasant, ³URDGNLOO´SURYLGHVD
source of flesh that would EHZDVWHGRWKHUZLVH³'XPSVWHU-GLYLQJ´SURYLGHVDQRWKHUDOWHUQDWLYH
again, though, dumpster-diving (which is criminalized in some jurisdictions) is a possibility only 
so long as we live in a society where NHA-GHULYHG SURGXFWV UHPDLQ D ³QRUPDO´ SDUW RI WKe 
human diet, and so will hopefully become less viable in time. 
Political solutions would involve seeking out a just alternative to current cat diets, 
perhaps through research funding. Most obviously, veterinarians can learn more about cat 
physiology and diets and so come to understand how they might easily thrive on vegan diets. For 
example, taurine is a nutrient that cats typically acquire from animal flesh, but vegan taurine 
supplements are already available ± further development in this area is easily conceivable. 
Animal welfare scientists might be able to discover that certain NHAs are actually unthinking, 
unfeeling entities, in which case they would not be covered by the typical approaches to animal 
ethics. If these NHAs could be used to feed our cats, then it seems that the dilemma could be 
averted. Research from animal ethicists and other normative theorists, too, could suggest creative 
solutions to the problem ± both temporary and permanent. For example, in a world in which 
humans and dogs were vegan there would be much space on which we could develop the most 
humane possible forms of farming.7 I defend an alternative elsewhere (Milburn, forthcoming), 
suggesting that while the discovery of some nonsentient NHA that is suitable as a food source for 
cats would be ideal, in the meantime, we could be permitted to feed to cats those NHAs for 
whom sentience is plausible, but not likely, such as certain shellfish. Importantly, I argue that we 
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PD\ KDYH GLIIHUHQW REOLJDWLRQV FRQFHUQLQJ RXU FDWV¶ GLHWV WKDQ RXU RZQ ZKLOH ZH FRXOG IHHG
certain shellfish to our cats, we would not be permitted to eat them ourselves. (Individual animal 
lovers, if they are confident that shellfish could provide a suitable food source for their 
companions but are not confident that a wholly vegan diet could, could follow this route.) The 
question of companion diets is not solely a scientific one, but something to which normative 
theorists could offer much. 
 
Concluding remarks 
I began this chapter with the observation that there is an oddity in the fact that in being an 
animal lover ± someone who shares their life with a nonhuman animal companion ± one often 
contributes to more NHA death and suffering than one ZRXOGRWKHUZLVH7KLV ³DQLPDO ORYHUV¶
SDUDGR[´ LV FORVHO\ UHODWHG WR WKH YHJHWDULDQ¶V GLOHPPD D WHUP that refers to the conflict 
veg(etari)ans feel when it comes to the possibility of feeding flesh to their companions. I 
presented an argument in favor of feeding vegan diets to our companions, before exploring four 
possible challenges. Arguments from NHA dignity face the problems of stating precisely what is 
meant by dignity, and of clarifying why a vegan diet is undignified. In addition, we may have 
reasons not to endorse dignity arguments at all. Arguments from naturalness face problems in 
explaining why naturalness is good, and encounter problems when it comes to companions in the 
first place. Further, even if naturalness is good and a vegan diet is unnatural, the badness 
(including destruction of the natural) of companion carnivory surely outweighs the goodness. 
The challenge from NHA freedom pits two animal ethics ideals against each other, but 
FRPSDQLRQV¶LQWHUHVWLQKDYLQJDZLGHUYDULHW\RIIRRGFKRLFHVFDQQRWRYHUULGHWKHIXQGDPHQWDO
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interests other NHAs have in not being killed or made to suffer, and, further, a vegan diet is not 
incompatible with a high degree of dietary freedom for companions anyway. 
The final challenge considered was the most important. The fact that it may not be 
healthy for companions (especially cats) to be fed a solely vegan diet leads to important 
distinctions that need to be made. With dogs, our moral and political obligations seem to fit 
neatly together; these companions should be converted to vegan diets. With cats, however, our 
moral and political obligations seem to diverge.8 While individual animal lovers should seek to 
limit WKH GHDWK DQG VXIIHULQJ LQ WKHLU FDWV¶ GLHWV FRPSOHWHO\ HOLPLQDWLQJ LW PD\ QRW DOZD\V EH
possible. However, as a political community, we should be funding research into how the 
suffering and death currently entailed by FDWV¶ GLHWV FDQ EH removed entirely. With further 
research, good will and wider awareness, we can hope that all members of our community ± 
humans and companions ± can come to survive and flourish in ways that are respectful of the 
fundamental interests of sensitive nonhuman animals. 
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1
 In private correspondence, Cochrane has told me that companion diet is an issue to which he 
has given considerable thought. Like me, he considers it an important ethico-political issue, and 
not simply a question for veterinary nutrition. 
2
 Readers unhappy with this assumption should consider a world in which many products are 
made with slave labor. (Note that I am not making a claim about the comparative badness of 
slavery and animal agriculture.) We may worry about the effect that we as an individual can have 
on the institution of slave labor, and we might be surrounded by family and friends who happily 
consume the products of slavery ± SHUKDSV WKH\ WDON DERXW KRZ LW LV ³QDWXUDO,´ ³QRUPDO,´
³QHFHVVDU\´RU³QLFH´WRXVHVODYHVFI3LD]]DHWDO1RQHWKHOHVVZHZRXOGVXUHO\KDYH
an obligation to avoid the products of slavery, especially if it was easy for us to do so, and given 
that our abstention could convince others to refrain. 
One might object that this thought experiment would only have an effect upon the current 
question if we held that the consumption of NHA-derived foods was just as bad as human 
slavery. However, the fact that we would and should continue to abstain from the products of 
slavery in the imagined case shows us that the stated concerns are not overridingly significant; 
the burden of proof would be on the person who objected to veganism to illustrate why these 
counterarguments were convincing for veganism but not slavery. 
3
 I have borrowed the tripartite split of NHA dignity accounts into relational, individualist and 
species-based IURP)HGHULFR=XROR+\EULGSRVLWLRQVDUHSRVVLEOH$QGHUVRQ¶VDFFRXQWis 
a hybrid species-based/relational account, for example. 
4
 Nussbaum talks of human dignity, but there is no reason to think that NHA dignity is any 
different. 
5
 With thanks to Anne Barnhill for this point. 
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6
 This is not a speciesist claim. Physiological differences are, here, morally relevant.  
7
 With thanks to Chris Thompson for this observation. 
8
 This divergence is not unique to the current problem. In the UK, all medicines are tested on 
NHAs, so vegans face a dilemma when ill. Refusing medication cannot be the answer, but 
neither can we ignore the ethical demands upon us. As individuals, the best solution may be to 
accept medication tested on NHAs, but nonetheless demand that it does not contain NHA-
derived ingredients ± to minimize impact. As with companion diets, though, our moral and 
political obligations diverge in interesting ways; even if we are reliant on the products of 
vivisection, we retain an obligation to oppose it politically and socially. 
